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Abstract
How do voters react to information about aggregate turnout? Do high turnout levels 
mobilize or discourage citizens to vote? We argue that it depends on individuals’ 
degree of conformity. We argue that in addition to the classic calculus of voting, 
conformist voters have an added incentive to ‘follow the pack’ and vote when turn-
out is high while abstain when turnout is low. We conduct two separate experiments, 
the first a survey experiment with a representative sample of the UK population and 
the second a lab experiment in Canada. Both studies confirm our hypothesis. These 
findings highlight the importance of taking individuals’ level of conformity into 
account when explaining their decision to vote or abstain.
Keywords Conformity · Turnout · Survey experiment · Lab experiment
“men nearly always follow the tracks made by others and proceed in their affairs 
by imitation”
Machiavelli’s Prince (1514)
Introduction
How do voters react to information about aggregate turnout? Are they more or 
less likely to vote when they are informed that turnout is high? The classic rational 
choice model (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968) has clear predictions in this 
regard: people should be more inclined to vote when presented with information that 
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turnout is low and to abstain when informed that turnout is high. But the opposite 
may also be true: people may be more inclined to engage in an activity when more 
people are doing it (Cialdini 1993; Coleman 1994). As a consequence, they may be 
more likely to vote when they are told that most other people vote and to abstain 
when they are informed that most other people abstain. In this study we argue that 
the response to our initial questions depends on individuals’ degree of conformity—
the individual’s basic predisposition to conform or not to ‘collective opinion’.
More specifically, we predict that conformists are more likely to ‘follow the pack’ 
and react positively to expected aggregate turnout while non-conformists are more 
inclined to react negatively to such information. Our study is about ‘impersonal 
influence’, and it is very much a complement to Mutz’ (1999) influential book on 
‘how perceptions of mass collectives affect political attitudes’. Mutz is concerned 
with how collective opinion affects individual judgments (see her chapter  8), and 
thus her dependent variables are attitudes and opinions though she also considers 
candidate preferences and vote choice. Our dependent variable is the decision to 
vote or abstain, which Mutz does not examine.1
We should point out at the outset that there are distinct reasons why voters may 
change their predisposition to vote as we vary information on expected aggregate 
turnout. First is the main contribution of our study: there are context dependent 
expressive motivations that lead conformist citizens to act in line with what oth-
ers do, and non-conformist citizens do the reverse. Second is the usual instrumental 
motivation that leads ‘rational actors’ to consider the benefits and costs of voting 
and conclude that the expected benefits get lower as aggregate turnout gets higher.
The inclination to imitate can be construed to be an evolutionary trait that helps 
species to learn from successful ancestors (Gibson and Hoglund 1992). Imitation is 
a deep-rooted trait that influences social behavior. Indeed, social psychologists have 
devoted much attention to social conformity, defined as “the act of changing one’s 
behavior to match the responses of others” (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004, p. 606). 
One of the best-known studies on social conformity is the Asch-type experiment in 
which subjects are shown to rally to the majority viewpoint, even if that viewpoint is 
clearly incorrect (for a meta-analysis see Bond and Smith 1996).
In an important paper, Stanley Feldman (2003) argues that in the fundamental 
problem of maintaining social order, individuals are faced with a dilemma between 
the goals of personal autonomy and social cohesion. The tension between the val-
ues of autonomy and social conformity, Feldman contends, is universal. He refers to 
Schwartz’s (1992; see also Schwartz 1994 and Vecchione et al 2015) study of social 
values, which shows that the two principal components among 56 different values 
are self-direction and conformity. As Feldman notes, the relative emphasis that is 
put on these two values varies across societies and among individuals in a society.
Applied to an individual’s decision to turn out to vote in general elections, this 
dilemma may be interpreted as follows: should a voter evaluate “autonomously” her 
own costs and benefits of voting (calculus of voting) or should she instead follow 
1 She devotes one paragraph (p. 190) to a review of studies about the impact of pre-election polls on 
turnout.
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what other people do? We know the former leads to a very low turnout in large N 
elections. The latter could yield a high turnout when expectations of aggregate turn-
out are high: high conformity individuals want to go along with the majority and 
vote as well.
There is evidence that more than 25% of subjects in controlled non-strategic labo-
ratory situations conform to the announced behavior of others (Fatas et al 2017). In 
this same study, it is suggested that conforming behavior does not follow the Social 
Identity Theory where “individuals strive to achieve or to maintain positive social 
identity" (Tajfel and Turner 1979).2 Instead, Social Comparison Theory appears to 
drive conforming behavior in their experiments: subjects seem to “evaluate their 
opinions and abilities by comparison respectively with the opinions and abilities of 
others” (Festinger 1954, p. 118).
There has been little work on how social conformity affects turnout. Gerber and 
Rogers (2009) run two field experiments in the US and find that emphasizing high 
turnout is most effective at increasing citizens’ intention to vote in an election; peo-
ple are more willing to vote when they are told that many others will participate. 
While such studies provide evidence that some people are affected by impersonal 
influence, they do not tell us whether that impact depends on their degree of social 
conformity. We wish to fill the gap and measure the heterogeneous effect of infor-
mation about turnout on subjects with different degrees of social conformity. Indi-
viduals differ in the importance that they attach to conformity versus autonomy, and 
these differences should condition how they react to information on aggregate turn-
out. In an ideal experimental design, we would manipulate social conformity and 
obtain causal estimates of its interaction effect with aggregate turnout on the prob-
ability of voting. However, to the best of our imagination, it is impossible to exog-
enously manipulate such an inherent characteristic of our experimental subjects so 
we will for now be contented with measuring conformity as a covariate.
We thus formulate and test a very simple hypothesis. How one reacts to infor-
mation about aggregate turnout depends on one’s degree of conformity. In other 
words, we expect a positive interaction between subjects’ degree of conformity and 
the announced aggregate turnout. Non-conformists become less prone to vote when 
they are informed that turnout is high while conformists have the opposite reaction 
– their propensity to vote increases.
It is appropriate to point out the similarities and differences between our perspec-
tive and lines of prior research. There is a connection between our focus on con-
formity and previous work on civic duty, defined as “the belief that a citizen has 
a moral obligation to vote in elections” (Blais and Galais 2016, p. 61). Both duty 
and conformity can be construed as deep attitudes that may be related to personality 
traits (Weinschenk 2014). Civic duty is an ethical judgment; the person feels that she 
has a moral obligation to fulfill (Blais and Achen 2019). In that sense, she feels she 
has to conform to a norm. Note, however, that in this case the norm is internalized; 
2 Bernheim (1994) is to the best of our knowledge the only paper that formalises conformity a la Social 
Identity Theory with a game theoretical model where players care about their social status and can only 
affect it by showing conformity through their actions.
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the person who votes out of duty does so because she believes it is the right thing to 
do, she would feel guilty if she were to abstain. In contrast, the person who votes out 
of conformity does so simply because she wants to do like most other people, and 
she would be inclined to abstain if most other people abstained.
There is also a connection to be made between our perspective and research on 
the impact of social pressure on turnout (Knack 1992; Schram and Sonnemans 1996; 
Blais et al. Forthcoming). Those who vote out of social pressure implicitly conform 
to the norm that the good citizen should vote. From this perspective, it is useful to 
distinguish descriptive and injunctive norms (Cialdini et al. 1990); the former refer 
to what other people do and the latter to what other people believe the individual 
should do. In our case, we are interested in the impact of descriptive norms, as we 
wish to determine how people react to information about aggregate turnout.
In what follows, we first formalize the role of conformity on the calculus of vot-
ing and later show results of both a survey and laboratory experiments that confirm 
our hypothesis.
The Calculus of Voting with Conformity Considerations
In order to characterize the tension between social conformity and self-interest, we 
develop a simple theoretical framework that captures the behavior of a rational indi-
vidual. For this purpose, we assume there are (N + 1) voters and two candidates (A 
and B) . Whether a voter prefers candidate A or B is private information yet it is com-
mon knowledge that any voter has an equal probability of preferring A or B . We 
denote U > 0 the utility difference between the favoured candidate and the disfa-
vored one. Voters incur a cost C > 0 when voting. This cost is also private informa-
tion yet the distribution from which it is drawn is common knowledge –costs are 
distributed according to the density function f (⋅) in the range [c
_
, c] , where c > c
_
> 0 . 
We assume that the costs of voting are independent and not correlated with the vot-
er’s preferred candidate. After privately observing costs, the preferred candidate and 
an informative signal on the expected aggregate turnout, voters need to decide 
whether to vote or abstain (when voting, it is weakly dominant to vote for the pre-
ferred candidate). The chosen candidate is the one that receives a majority of the 
votes; ties are resolved by the toss of a coin.
The Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game of incomplete information 
is characterized by cutpoint strategies that state the cost above which a voter should 
abstain (Palfrey and Rosenthal 1985). Both our survey and lab experiments are 
stripped of strategic uncertainty and can be analyzed as a decision theoretic problem 
where the (N + 1)th subject observes a perfectly informative signal about aggregate 
turnout and votes when the following inequality is satisfied.
where p is the probability the voter is pivotal, U is the utility difference between 
candidates, C is the cost of voting, D is the usual context independent expressive 
component (e.g. civic duty), and the last term captures the role of conformity in the 
p ⋅ U − C + D + 𝛾 ⋅ (T − 50) > 0
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calculus of voting. T is the (expected) aggregate turnout among the other N voters in 
percentage points and γ ≥ 0 is the subject’s level of conformity. Note we are consid-
ering deviation from a 50% turnout so that a conformist voter sees a decrease in her 
probability of voting when aggregate turnout is low and an increase when aggregate 
turnout is high. Note that empirically we will not able to derive the threshold above 
which conformists vote more (or below which conformists vote less) as our design 
only allows us to identify ( D − 훾 ⋅ 50).
The Survey Experiment
In order to test our hypothesis, we conducted a survey experiment in April 2017 via 
YouGov on a representative sample of British citizens. We initially considered hav-
ing two treatments announcing an expected high or low turnout and asking respond-
ents to report whether such announcement made them more or less willing to vote. 
However, this design might not perfectly identify the relationship we are after as 
some respondents might interpret expected turnout as a sign of the closeness of the 
election—they might believe there is high turnout because the election is close.3 
For this reason we designed a two by two treatment that allows us to control for 
the closeness of the election. Namely, one of the following four treatments was ran-
domly assigned to each subject:
It’s polling day for the UK general election and you are told that the election 
[will/will not] be very close and turnout will be very [high/low]. Does this 
make you: much more willing to vote, slightly more willing to vote, slightly 
less willing to vote, much less willing to vote, or does it make no difference?
Our variable of interest is the subjects’ willingness to vote. We code this vari-
able “ − 2” when the subject is much less willing to vote, “ − 1” when the subject is 
slightly less willing to vote, “0” when there is no difference, “ + 1” when the sub-
ject is slightly more willing to vote, and “ + 2” when the subject is much more will-
ing to vote. The modal response (56%) is ‘no difference’. The second most frequent 
response (31%) is ‘much more willing to vote’.
Social conformity is measured with Feldman’s (2003) battery of 17 paired alter-
native items (see Online Appendix A1 for a detailed description).4 The answers to 
each of the 17 pairs were recoded so that 1 identifies the conformist option and 0 
the non-conformist (autonomy) option. We add all responses and obtain a conform-
ity scale that can take any integer value between 0 and 17. Feldman himself distin-
guishes between 5 dimensions within this conformity measure (2003, Table  1, p. 
54) and also notes that factor analysis reveals “strong evidence of a single common 
factor” (Feldman 2003, p. 55) underlying the responses to the 17 paired alternatives. 
3 On the relationship between the closeness of an election and turnout see Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) 
and Franklin (2004).
4 The order in which our treatments on willingness to vote and the conformity questions were asked was 
randomized; the order does not affect any of our results so we pool together both cases in our analysis.
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Hence we keep the full measure for our main analysis yet, in Online Appendix A11, 
we replicate our main empirical tests considering only the paired alternative items 
that, according to Feldman, capture the trade-off between conformity and autonomy 
(the first three in Table A1 in Online Appendix). All our results are robust to such an 
extension.
The survey also includes a host of other variables: age, gender, education, 
income, class, and region of residence. Finally, the literature on political behavior 
has emphasized the impact of the Big Five personality traits (agreeableness, con-
sciousness, extraversion, neuroticism, and openness) on citizens’ behavior.5 Meas-
uring these traits should allow us to test for potential spurious correlation between 
conformity, expected turnout and willingness to vote.
We first report aggregate results by dividing our sample in the middle: we call 
conformists those that score higher than 7 on the conformity scale (1004 observa-
tions) and non-conformists those that score smaller or equal than 7 (1007 observa-
tions). In Table 1 we show the average willingness to vote among conformists and 
non-conformists according to the treatment they were exposed to, i.e. close or not 
close election, and expected high or low turnout.
We see that subjects are driven by instrumental considerations as they increase 
their willingness to vote when the election is close. As conjectured, the impact of 
expected aggregate turnout is conditional on whether the person is conformist or 
not: moving from low to high turnout increases the likelihood of voting among con-
formists and has the opposite effect among non-conformists. Note that all averages 
are above zero (recall that the willingness to vote variable can take values between 
−2 and 2) which might be an indication of the social desirability bias in showing 
willingness to vote in elections (Edwards 1957).
There is the possibility that the observed conditional impact of social conformity 
is spurious, that it reflects the fact that conformists have peculiar socio-demographic 
profiles or specific personality traits. Indeed, our conformity score has a modest 
positive correlation with consciousness (0.12), and a modest negative correlation 
with extraversion (− 0.11) and openness (− 0.35). We therefore regress willingness 
to vote on the respondent’s conformity score (from 0 to 17), a dummy capturing 
the high turnout treatment and the interaction between the latter two variables. We 
Table 1  Average willingness to vote from subjects that score high / low on social conformity by treat-
ment (in brackets are the number of observations for each cell)
Conformists (score > 7) Non-Conformists (score ≤ 7)
Low turnout High turnout Low turnout High turnout
Not close 0.38 (243) 0.50 (245) Not close 0.68 (231) 0.42 (236)
Close 0.59 (255) 0.82 (262) Close 0.83 (270) 0.71 (270)
5 See Goldberg (1990, 1992, 1993), McCrae and Costa (1987, 1997) and Mondak et al. (2010).
1 3
Political Behavior 
control for the closeness of the election as well as a host of socio-demographic vari-
ables and the five personality traits. Results are presented in Table 2.
As predicted, high aggregate turnout depresses the propensity to vote among 
those who are at 0 on the conformity scale. The significant interaction term indi-
cates that the negative impact of high turnout diminishes for conformist individuals. 
The impact of high turnout becomes positive (+ 0.30) among the subjects that score 
highest on conformity. These key results are unchanged when we add further con-
trols to our initial specification: in column 2 we add individual controls (characteris-
tics such as age, gender, social grade, etc. as well as the Big Five personality traits—
in Online Appendix A2 we list all our controls and in Online Appendix A3 we 
replicate Table 2 without collapsing the estimates for the Big Five personality traits; 
our results are also robust to interacting all these covariates with our treatment). We 
run the same analysis with an ordered logit estimation (treating the five categories 
of willingness as ordinal) and with a binary logit estimation (contrasting those who 
responded slightly or much more willing with all others) and we always obtain a 
significant interaction effect between conformity and high turnout. In Online Appen-
dix A4 we provide further robustness checks showing that our results hold when we 
classify subjects in two or three categories according to their degree of conformity.
In order to illustrate the results above Table 3 summarizes the marginal effect of 
aggregate information turnout on the propensity to vote (column 2 in Table 2). We 
observe the interaction effect we are interested in for low turnout announcements: 
when turnout is expected to be low conformists are much less likely to vote than 
non-conformists. Instead, when turnout is expected to be high the differences are 
minimal (yet still in the expected direction: subjects scoring higher in the conformist 
scale are more likely to vote).
As explained above, we also controlled for the closeness of the election. Being 
told that the election is close substantially increases respondents’ willingness to 
vote. We further analyze the role conformity plays when the election is not close, i.e. 
Table 2  Linear regression on the willingness to vote
Standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Variables (1) (2) (3) close (4) not close
High turnout  − 0.244***
(.093)
 − 0.250***
(.093)
 − 0.024
(.131)
 − 0.507***
(.135)
Conformity  − 0.029***
(.008)
 − 0.027***
(.008)
 − 0.009
(.011)
 − 0.048***
(.012)
Conformity * High turnout 0.032***
(.011)
0.032***
(.011)
0.009
(.015)
0.058***
(.012)
Close election 0.244***
(.045)
0.244***
(.045)
Constant 0.714***
(.070)
 − 0.205
(.278)
0.186**
(.396)
 − 0.314
(.395)
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2011 2011 1056 955
Adjusted  R2 0.0196 0.0326 0.0023 0.0424
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when the propensity to vote hinges on one’s basic values and attitudes. We re-esti-
mate our model separately for close and not close elections. The results are shown 
in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2. We find that respondents’ propensity to vote is not 
affected by the level of turnout or by their degree of conformity, nor by the interac-
tion between the two, when the election is close (column 3). The relationships are 
instead strong when the election is not close (column 4). In this case, the willingness 
to vote score is 0.51 lower under high turnout among those with a conformity score 
of 0 and 0.46 higher among those with the maximum score of 17.
These results are in line with observational studies that show that election close-
ness increases voter turnout (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Cancela and Geys 2016; 
Franklin 2004; Geys 2006). When elections are close, no other considerations (i.e. 
expressive) significantly affect the likelihood of voting; instead, when elections are 
not close, non-instrumental motivations seem to prevail. This is noteworthy as the 
great majority of elections in democracies are won by wide margins—for instance, 
in the 2017 UK general election only 11 constituencies (out of 650) had a margin of 
victory below 100 votes.
The obvious question that arises from our survey study is whether the same 
pattern holds true when we can directly observe individuals’ behavior (voting or 
abstaining) rather than rely on self-declared responses. Replicating our analysis in 
controlled laboratory conditions where the act of voting is observed should allow us 
to more precisely measure the interaction effect of conformity and aggregate turn-
out. The obvious concern in a laboratory study on turnout is that group sizes are 
much smaller, hence instrumental motivations might dominate everyone’s decisions, 
irrespective of their degree of conformity. The lab thus provides a harder test of 
our hypothesis that the impersonal influence of “aggregate turnout” depends on how 
conformist one is.
The Laboratory Experiment
We design a lab experiment to test voters’ reactions to aggregate turnout. Our exper-
imental design is novel since it strips down all strategic uncertainty and does not 
require subjects constructing beliefs about expected aggregate turnout. We design 
a decision theoretic model where each of our subjects knows how many subjects 
in her group have previously voted, i.e. they hold perfect information on aggregate 
turnout in their group.
There are two candidates, A and B, and it is common knowledge that subjects 
have an equal probability of preferring either candidate, yet their own preference is 
Table 3  Average willingness 
to vote (variable ranges 
between − 2 and 2) as 
announcement on aggregate 
turnout and conformity levels 
change (standard errors in 
brackets)
Low turnout High turnout
Conformity = 0 0.833 (.068) 0.583 (.069)
Conformity = 8 0.614 (.032) 0.623 (.032)
Conformity = 17 0.368 (.082) 0.667 (.084)
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private information. Subjects need to decide whether to vote for their preferred can-
didate or to abstain. Voting entails a cost that is uniformly distributed in the interval 
[0, 5].6 These costs are independently drawn and privately announced to each sub-
ject (costs are independent of whether the subject prefers A or B). The outcome of 
the election is determined by plurality: the candidate that obtains most votes wins, 
and in case of a tie, each candidate wins with equal probability. The payoff to a sub-
ject that sees her candidate win is 10; the payoff when her preferred candidate loses 
is zero.7
All sessions are run through computer terminals in CIRANO’s Experimental 
Laboratory (Montreal, Canada) in the spring of 2015. Communication between sub-
jects is not allowed. At the start of each session the instructions are read aloud (see 
Online Appendix A5). The experiment takes just under an hour. Subjects are paid 
an average of $36.73 CAD (minimum payment is $15.96 and maximum payment is 
$73.45 CAD).
We initially run two sessions with 10 subjects each. The protocol is identical in 
all elections: subjects are privately announced their preference and cost and are then 
asked to vote (for their preferred candidate) or abstain; after all subjects have sub-
mitted their vote, the winning candidate is announced, and each subject is privately 
told the payoff obtained in that election. This election process is repeated 65 times. 
After the 65th election we randomly select five elections and pay subjects according 
to their payoff in those elections in Canadian dollars plus a 15$ show up fee. At the 
end of the session we ask subjects to answer a survey with the usual questions (age, 
gender, studies, and experience in lab experiments) and the battery of items we used 
in our survey experiment to measure social conformity.8
We then use the data from these initial sessions with 96 new subjects who par-
ticipate at a later date. These subjects face the same protocol (and instructions) with 
one exception: they are considered the 11th voter and are told how many of the pre-
vious 10 voters participated in the election. No information about the preferences 
or costs of the previous ten voters is revealed. The computer announces how many 
of them voted so that we can analyze the impact of information about aggregate 
turnout.9 Given that we are using information on turnout from our initial two ses-
sions, we can only announce that between 1 and 8 subjects previously voted. We 
6 We assume that costs and preferred candidates are privately known to ensure there is a unique equilib-
rium where subjects with costs below a certain threshold vote for their preferred alternative—see Levine 
and Palfrey 2007.
7 We specify our subjects’ payoffs in Canadian dollars while our experiment used Canadian cents (i.e. all 
values we report in the text correspond to 1/100 of the values used in our instructions).
8 We follow the common practice of first running the incentivized experiment, with no priming of any 
sort, and then asking the participants to answer some questions, among which the conformity ones. Note 
that no question in the conformity battery refers to voting so the connection between the experiment and 
the survey questions is not straightforward.
9 We did not announce the way the previous 10 subjects voted so that the 11th subject would not know 
whether she is pivotal or not. We use the last 5 elections to observe respondents’ behavior when they 
know whether they are pivotal or not (i.e. we announce the exact number of votes for each candidate). 
We find that conformists are less sensitive to pivotal events than non-conformists. The analysis in this 
paper focuses on the first 60 elections.
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pick a predetermined order in these announcements so that all subjects face the same 
conditions and all turnout announcements are (almost) equally likely—see Online 
Appendix A6 for details on these announcements.
In order to find any meaningful relationship between our conformity variable and 
the other variables we elicited in the post experimental survey, we linearly regress 
our conformity measure on age, gender, student status, years of schooling, experi-
ence in the lab and level of risk aversion. We find that being conformist is positively 
correlated with being risk averse. No other personal characteristic correlates with 
the conformity variable (detailed results are reported in Online Appendix A7).
We now proceed to test our main prediction that the propensity to vote decreases 
as aggregate turnout increases among those who score low on conformity while it 
increases among those who score high on conformity.10 The dependent variable 
(voted) takes the value of 1 if the subject voted and 0 if she abstained. The main 
independent variables are aggregate turnout, conformity, and the interaction between 
the two. Aggregate turnout is the number of previous subjects who had voted, and 
ranges from 1 to 8. Conformity is the individual’s score on the social conformity 
scale, which ranges from 0 to 14.11 We expect the main effect of turnout (among 
those with a score of 0 on conformity) to be negative and the interaction effect to 
be positive. Our model includes two control variables: cost and period. The cost of 
voting is an interval variable that goes from 0 to 5, and the period corresponds to the 
specific election, from 1 to 60. We expect a decrease in the propensity to vote as the 
cost of voting increases. The period variable allows for trends over time.
Table 4 presents the findings. We find support for our hypothesis: there is a strong 
interaction effect between turnout and conformity. The rational tendency to be less 
prone to vote when turnout is high weakens and is in fact reversed as one’s score on 
social conformity becomes higher. As expected, subjects are less inclined to vote 
when the cost of voting is higher and as the experiment progresses. As a robustness 
check in column (4) we run a random effects logistic regression where the panel 
variable is a unique identifier for each subject, and we see results analogous to our 
initial specification. Pressing our specification further in the last column we run a 
fixed effect logistic regression; this specification can no longer extract information 
from differences between subjects and the role of conformity is obviously omitted 
given that it is fixed for each of our individuals. However, we are still able to test our 
main hypothesis given that the announced turnout changes across the 60 periods. 
We see that, while controlling for each of our subjects’ idiosyncratic characteristics, 
all our results remain intact.12
12 Note that 8 subjects were dropped from this last specification with fixed effects because they did not 
change their behaviour throughout the experiment (i.e. always voted or always abstained).
10 The simple theoretical model we presented above replicates the conditions in our lab experiment.
11 All our results are robust to considering the previously mentioned alternative measure of conformity 
that only considers the first three items in Table 1 (the items that capture the trade-off between conform-
ity and autonomy, according to Feldman 2003)—see Online Appendix A11.
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Table 4  logistic regression on the probability of voting
Standard errors (clustered by subject) in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) Random effects (5) Fixed effects
Cost of voting  − 0.591*** (.057)  − 0.596*** (.058)  − 0.600*** (.058)  − 0.824*** (.028)  − 0.817*** (.028)
Aggregate turnout  − 0.063*** (.002)  − 0.064*** (.002)  − 0.160*** (.000)  − 0.224*** (.033)  − 0.224*** (0.33)
Conformity  − 0.050 (.172)  − 0.122*** (.007)  − 0.169*** (.063) –-
Conformity * Aggregate 
turnout
0.016*** (.000) 0.022*** (.005) 0.022*** (.005
Period  − 0.005** (.049)  − 0.005** (.046)  − 0.005** (.047)  − 0.007**
(.002)
 − 0.007 (0.002)
Constant 1.443** (.241) 1.764** (.346) 2.212** (.392) 2.964** (.451) –-
Observations 5760 5760 5760 5760 5760 (88 groups)
Log likelihood  − 3441  − 3425  − 3417  − 2744 -2357
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In Online Appendix A9 we provide further robustness checks showing that our 
results hold when we classify subjects in two or three categories according to their 
degree of conformity.
A subject in our sample scoring lowest on the conformist scale (0) reacts neg-
atively to information on aggregate turnout: her predicted probability of voting 
decreases from 0.59 (standard deviation, sd, 0.07) to 0.35 (sd = 0.05) when the turn-
out announcement turnout shifts from 1 to 8. This is indeed consistent with the cal-
culus of voting.
However, the propensity to vote for the subjects that are most conformists in our 
sample (14) increases from 0.28 (sd = 0.06) to 0.37 (sd = 0.06) as her expectations 
shift from an expected low turnout (1) to an expected high turnout (8). These find-
ings clearly support our hypothesis: the impersonal influence of aggregate turnout 
depends on what kind of person she is, more precisely how much she values auton-
omy versus conformity.
As we previously did, we illustrate our main findings by computing marginal 
effects. In Table 5 below we report the estimated probability of voting (according 
to the specification of Column 3 in Table 4) as we vary the aggregate turnout and 
conformity levels.
Finally, in Online Appendix A10, rather than looking at 5760 decisions made 
by 96 individuals participating in 60 elections, we look separately at each of the 
96 individuals and see how their decisions are affected by the cost of voting and 
aggregate turnout across these 60 elections. For each subject we estimate her strat-
egy and find further evidence that the propensity to react positively to higher turnout 
increases with the individual’s level of conformity.
Conclusion
Our research highlights the importance of including social conformity in the study 
of political phenomena. Recent research in political psychology has focused on the 
Big Five personality traits (see especially Mondak et al. 2010) but our study sug-
gests that we should go beyond these personality traits. Politics is very much about 
collective decision-making, so there is an underlying tension between the desire for 
personal autonomy and the need for social norms that are respected and followed by 
everyone in the community. Citizens strike a different balance between these two 
considerations, and this is bound to shape their behavior.
We have combined a survey experiment conducted in Britain and a lab experi-
ment performed in Canada to test our hypothesis. Both studies produced remarkably 
Table 5  Estimated probability 
of voting conditional on 
aggregate turnout and 
conformity levels (standard 
errors in brackets)
Turnout = 1 Turnout = 5 Turnout = 10
Conformity = 0 0.584 (.066) 0.450 (.054) 0.291 (.049)
Conformity = 8 0.406 (.030) 0.379 (.026) 0.346 (0.034)
Conformity = 17 0.230 (.072) 0.305 (.074) 0.413 (0.098)
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similar findings: in both instances, people who score higher on the social conformity 
scale are more prone to vote (abstain) when they know that most other people vote 
(abstain) while those who score low on the conformity scale have exactly the oppo-
site reaction. If a predicted high turnout makes conformists more inclined to vote 
and if there are many conformists in the electorate, then a relatively high turnout 
would be an equilibrium.
The implications of our study hinge in good part of the distribution of individuals 
across the conformity scale in a given society at a given point in time. To the best of 
our knowledge there are no time-series or cross-section data about the distribution of 
conformity across societies or over time. The data that we have collected in Britain 
(see Fig. A1 in Online Appendix A1) suggest a relatively normal distribution, with 
the mean (7.52 on a 0 to 17 scale) indicating a slight majority of non-conformists. 
The point remains that, at least in our representative poll of British society, there are 
many people with conformist leanings.
We therefore end with a call for more attention to be paid to an individual’s 
social conformity. A huge literature exists in social psychology about the role of 
conformity, yet little research has been devoted to its impact in political life. Our 
study suggests that it is a crucial variable in the decision to vote or abstain. There 
are good reasons to believe that it shapes other political phenomena such as the deci-
sion to participate in demonstrations or to engage in strategic or bandwagon vot-
ing. It makes sense to assume that many people pay attention to information about 
what others in the community are likely to do when deciding whether to vote or 
abstain. Political scientists need to integrate such considerations into their models 
and analyses.
Our study also raises important questions about the relationship between social 
conformity and other factors that may affect voter turnout. One such question per-
tains to the relationship between social conformity and sense of civic duty. Are con-
formists more prone to believe that they have a moral obligation to vote? Are both 
attitudes shaped by personality traits? Another set of questions is about the relation-
ship between social conformity and social pressure. We would expect conformists 
to pay attention to social pressure. But what kind of social pressure? In this study, 
we have examined how conformists react to information about aggregate turnout. 
But what happens when conformists are exposed to conflicting information, if/when 
for instance they learn that turnout in the country is going to be high but that most 
friends/relatives are going to abstain? These are big questions about which we have 
no clear answer.
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